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This study provides empirical evidence on the effects of corruption, as proxied by 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, on earnings management. It tests 
the hypothesis of positive association between the countries’ level of corruption and the level 
of earnings management using a sample of foreign firms with American Depositary Receipts 
(ADR) in the U.S. market. Findings indicate that corruption perception is related to higher 
incentives for firms to manipulate earnings in the case of emerging countries. Such results 
are not identified in developed countries.  


















The effects of corruption on earnings management 
1. Introduction 
This study analyzes the influence of country-level and firm-level incentives in the level of 
earnings management of foreign firms with American Depositary Receipts (ADR) in the U.S. 
market, highlighting the role of corruption as a determinant of accounting quality.  
Research on earnings management has a long history (Healy and Whalen, 1999; 
Dechow and Skinner, 2000; Walker, 2013). One of the most widely accepted definitions of 
earnings management is that of Healy and Wahlen (1999, p. 368): “Earnings management 
occurs when managers use judgement in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to 
alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic 
performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported 
accounting numbers.”  
A wide diversity of behaviours may be encompassed within the notion of earnings 
management, ranging from those which comply with the accounting standards in place to those 
that violate said standards. In this perspective, Dechow and Skinner (2000) distinguish 
between behaviours that clearly demonstrate intent to deceive, which can be considered under 
the umbrella of fraudulent accounting, and behaviours that, although being aggressive, are 
acceptable ways for managers to exercise their discretion.  
According to Healy and Whalen (1999, p. 380) earnings management may occur for a 
variety of reasons, including “to influence stock market perceptions, to increase management’s 
compensation, to reduce the likelihood of violating lending agreements, and to avoid regulatory 
interventions”.  Graham et al. (2005) found that managers want to meet or beat earnings 
benchmarks to build credibility with the capital market, maintain or increase stock price, 
improve the external reputation of the management team, and convey future growth prospects. 
A recent paper by Dichev et al. (2013) estimated that about 20% of public firms manage their 
earnings figures, and that the typical management is about 10% of the earnings per share.  
The classic definition of corruption as the “abuse of public power for private benefit”, very 
popular among economists and for many years used by the World Bank, is objectionable for 
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many reasons, but especially for focusing on the public sector and being biased against the 
party who receives the undeserved benefits (the public official). The former objection have lead 
Transparency International (TI) to replace “public power” by “entrusted power” and define 
corruption as “the misuse of entrusted power for private benefit” (Errath et al., 2005, p. 2).  
Although this latter definition is widely used nowadays, it is unable to deal with the 
objection of portraying corruption as a one-way process driven by the greed of the corrupt 
person with “entrusted power”. Hence, a more complex definition of corruption is needed. A 
possible solution is the definition proposed by Argandoña (2005, p. 252): corruption is “the act 
or effect of giving or receiving a thing of value, in order that a person do or omit to do something, 
in violation of a formal or implicit rule about what that person ought to do or omit to do, to the 
benefit of the person who gives the thing of value or a third party”.  
The wide-ranging negative effects of corruption are legion. They include constrained 
economic growth, decreased trust in government and reduced legitimacy of market economy 
and democracy (Branco and Delgado, 2012). Given its detrimental effects, corruption is 
considered by many as a cancer in society (Everett et al., 2007).  
Everett et al. (2007, p. 515) are adamant in asserting that “the issue of corruption is a 
problem and accounting can aid in its fight”. Although this may well be true, accounting 
researchers have left the relation between accounting and corruption almost untouched. About 
ten years ago, Riahi-Bealkaoui (2004, p. 74) asserted that “one consequence largely ignored 
in the economic and accounting literature is the impact of corruption on the quality of 
accounting”. This consequence has remained largely unexplored in said literature. Few studies 
have explored the relation between the level of corruption and accounting quality (Kimbro, 
2002; Riahi-Belkaoui, 2004; Wu, 2005; Riahi-Belkaoui and AlNajjar, 2006; Malageño et al., 
2010; Houqe and Monem, 2013).  
We add to this literature, in particular to the studies of Riahi-Belkaoui (2004) and Riahi-
Belkaoui and AlNajjar (2006), by analyzing the relation of earnings management (a measure 
of accounting quality) with countries’ corruption levels. More specifically, we examine whether 
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firms from countries presenting higher levels of corruption are more likely to have higher levels 
of earnings management than their counterparts from countries with lower levels of corruption.  
The empirical study relies on foreign firms with ADR in the U.S. market that apply 
International Financial reporting Standards (IFRS). We thus guarantee the homogeneity of the 
sample, which is based on firms with greater incentives to transparency that apply a set of high 
quality accounting standards. Prior literature show a positive effect of IFRS adoption on foreign 
firms cross-listed in the US, namely in their accounting quality (Sun et al., 2011), in their credit 
ratings (Ling-Ching et al., 2013), and in the comparability of their financial information with US-
GAAP amounts (Barth et al., 2012). Hence, contrary to Riahi-Belkaoui (2004) and Riahi-
Belkaoui and AlNajjar (2006), our study is conducted in a setting of relatively stable accounting 
environment, with firms providing high quality financial information somewhat comparable with 
that reported by US firms. 
The research design controls for important country-level and firm-level characteristics 
that previous literature analyzed as being linked with earnings management, such as the firms’ 
size and profitability or the level of minority investors’ protection or the level of contract 
enforcement.  
The empirical findings suggest that only in the case of emerging countries there is a 
positive relation between the level of perceived corruption and the level of earnings 
management (there is a negative relation between the Corruption Perception Index and 
earnings management). In the case of emerging countries, there is strong evidence that firms 
from countries with higher levels of perceived corruption are more likely to present higher levels 
of earnings management.  
In the following section we review some relevant studies and develop the hypotheses. 
The third section is devoted to the research design. The fourth section presents the main 





2. Background and hypothesis  
Many studies on earnings management consider the phenomena of corruption as a 
factor influencing earnings management. However, the majority of them do this in an indirect 
way by using a variable measuring the strength of legal environment, which is the average 
score of three legal variables used in La Porta et al. (1998): the efficiency of the judicial system, 
an assessment of the rule of law, and the level of corruption (Leuz et al., 2003; Shen and Chih, 
2005, 2007; Chih et al., 2008; Doupnick, 2008; Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen, 2008; Li et al., 
2011).  
González and García-Meca (2014) used a measure of the governability level of a country 
that considers the following three main indicators: control of corruption, rule of law, and 
government effectiveness. Following extant literature, these authors suggest that these 
indicators are important factors in measuring the way in which the governability of a country 
affects opportunistic behaviour in firms.  
In spite of this, and although there is a wealth of literature on both corruption and 
accounting quality, studies analysing possible relations between the two are scarce. We were 
able to identify only five studies in this area: Kimbro (2002), Riahi-Belkaoui (2004), Wu (2005), 
Riahi-Belkaoui and AlNajjar (2006), Malagueño et al. (2010) and Houqe and Monem (2013). 
Both Kimbro (2002), Wu (2005), Malagueño et al. (2010) and Houqe and Monem (2013) 
emphasize the role potentially played by accounting in curbing corruption. Kimbro (2002) 
performed a cross-country analysis of corruption on the basis of a model exploring the effects 
of economic, cultural, and monitoring/institutional variables on corruption. Regarding economic 
variables, her findings suggest that GNP per capita is inversely associated with the level of 
corruption, whereas high levels of economic growth is associated with higher levels of 
corruption. In the case of cultural values, power distance and individualism were found to be 
positively associated with corruption. Regarding the relations between the quality of the 
accounting and legal systems and corruption, Kimbro found that countries with good laws 
enforced by more effective judiciary, good financial reporting standards, and a higher 
concentration of accountants are likely to be less corrupt.  
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Wu (2005) used cross-country firm-level data from Asian countries to examine the 
relationship between corporate accounting practices and the level of bribery. This author found 
that although better accounting practices are helpful in reducing both the incidence of bribery 
and the amounts of bribe payments, merely conforming to high quality accounting standards 
alone does not necessarily bring down the incidence of bribery.  
Malagueño et al. (2010) performed a cross-country analysis using data from 57 countries 
to examine the relation between corruption and two measures of accounting quality: the 
increased presence of BIG4 firms and perceived accounting quality (PAQ) data obtained from 
the survey administered annually by the World Economic Forum in its Global Competitiveness 
Survey. While controlling for several other variables considered in the literature, they found 
evidence of negative relationships between the perceived level of corruption and both the 
increased presence of BIG4 firms in countries and the PAQ. They conclude that “countries 
with more transparent reporting have lower levels of perceived corruption and that the level of 
perceived corruption may be reduced in a country by improving accounting and auditing 
quality” (Malagueño et al., 2010, p. 372).  
Houqe and Monem (2013) used data from 166 countries, over the period 1996-2011, to 
investigate the role of accounting information in reducing corruption after controlling for the 
effects of political institutions and economic development. Their findings suggest that although 
the accounting environment has some positive effect in the control of corruption, its role is 
relatively minor and secondary to the effect of political institutions. They contend that the widely 
held view that countries intending to reduce corruption should invest in higher-quality 
accounting standards may not be true. Their findings also lead them so suggest that countries 
without strong political institutions that have adopted the IFRS are not likely to achieve a 
reduction in corruption by way of improved financial reporting unless political institutions are 
strengthened.  
Although also exploring the relationships between accounting quality and corruption, 
both Riahi-Belkaoui (2004) and Riahi-Belkaoui and AlNajjar (2006) examined the determinants 
of earnings opacity internationally using data from 34 countries. Riahi-Belkaoui’s (2004) results 
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suggest the existence of a negative relationship between earnings opacity and the lack of 
corruption after controlling for economic development, human development, size of 
government and economic freedom. Based on an explanation resting on the impact of 
corruption as it uses the lack of accounting quality to “camouflage” the ill-gained results, Riahi-
Belkoui (2004, p. 82) concludes that “corruption creates a climate conducive to a low quality 
accounting.” 
The findings of Riahi-Belkaoui and AlNajjar (2006) indicate that earnings opacity is 
negatively related to the level of economic freedom and the level of quality of life and positively 
related to the rule of law, economic growth and the level of corruption. In addition, earnings 
opacity was surprisingly found as not related to various measures of accounting order, namely 
the level of disclosure, the number of auditors per 100,000 inhabitants and the adoption of 
international accounting standards. These authors conclude that “it is the social and economic 
climate rather than the technical accounting climate that is at the core of the lack of accounting 
quality in general and earnings opacity in particular” (Riahi-Belkaoui and AlNajjar, 2006, p. 
189).  
Following these two latter articles, the study reported in this paper is premised on the 
idea that lower levels of corruption will be associated with lower levels of earning management, 
used as a measure of accounting quality. Riahi-Belkaoui (2004) suggests two arguments that 
may be used to justify this thesis of a negative relationship between the corruption and 
earnings management. First, the rent seeking behaviour that constitutes corruption needs to 
be as concealed as possible from the eyes of the citizens and all those affected by it. Hence, 
a system of accountability flexible enough to veil the actions and consequences of corruption 
is needed. As Riahi-Belkaoui (2004, p. 74) puts it, there is “the need for a lower quality 
accounting for manufacturing a higher level of corruption.” Second, high levels of corruption 
create an unethical atmosphere that leads individuals to have high levels of acceptance 
regarding such rent-seeking behaviour.  These attitudes extend easily to other activities, 
including those pertaining to the collection and dissemination of accounting information. Riahi-
Belkaoui (2004, p. 75) thus suggests that “one would expect a low quality of accounting from 
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a country that tolerates or fails to reduce corruption.” Therefore, the hypothesis to be tested is 
one of a positive association between the countries’ level of corruption and the level of earnings 
management.  
 
3. Research Design 
This study aims to analyze the influence of country-level and firm-level incentives in the 
level of earnings management of foreign firms with ADR in the U.S. market, highlighting the 
role of corruption as a determinant of accounting quality.  
In order to achieve this goal, we first establish a measure for earnings management 
and then built an empirical model that associates this measure with the two sets of variables, 
country and firm-level. 
 
3.1 Sample and Data 
Our sample comprises firms from 33 countries with ADR in the U.S. market that report 
their financial statements under IFRS. The empirical study is thus conducted in a setting of 
relatively stable accounting environment, without the need of controlling for the use of more 
developed accounting standards. 
We use data from 2011 to 2013 in order to get the largest possible number of countries 
applying IFRS. The data used to compute the earnings management measure and the firm-
level variables is collected from the Worldscope Database. The data used to compute the 
country-level variables is collected from the World Bank database.  
After excluding extreme values (top and bottom 1%) the final sample consists of 1,281 
firm-year observations, regarding 427 firms. Table 1 presents the distribution of these firm-
year observations by country and by industry. We also segregate the observations according 
to the type of country, emerging or developed, based on the classification provided by the 
World Bank Database.  
 
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
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Table 1, Panel A, shows that the observations from Brazil and South Africa represent 
54% of the emerging countries data (17% of all observations). In Table 1, Panel B, we observe 
that Australia and United Kingdom account for 42% of developed countries data (29% of all 
observations). Table 1, Panel C, shows that most of the observations are from manufacturing 
and utilities industries. 
 
3.2 Measure of Earnings Management 
We use the magnitude of absolute discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings 
management. According to Leuz et al. (2003), managers can use discretion to misstate their 
firm’s economic performance, for example, overstating reported earnings in order to reach a 
target or report extraordinary performance in specific situations. The magnitude of 
discretionary accruals measures the extent to which managers exercise discretions in 
reporting earnings.  
Greater magnitude of discretionary accruals reflects difficulties in accounting numbers in 
effectively measuring economic performance (Warfield et al., 1995). As income-increasing 
accruals and income-decreasing accruals can be used in earnings management, it is common 
to use the magnitude of absolute discretionary accruals. Greater magnitudes indicate greater 
level of earnings managements and lower accounting quality (Chen et al, 2010). 
Discretionary (abnormal) accruals can be measured as the total accruals minus 
estimated non-discretionary (normal) accruals. Several models can estimate normal accruals. 
This study uses a modified version of the model proposed by Jones (1991). 
Dechow et al. (1995) analyzed some alternative accrual-based models for detecting 
earnings management and found that the most powerful model is the modified version of the 
model developed by Jones (1991). The original model uses a regression approach to identify 
non-discretionary factor by a linear relation between total accruals and change in sales and in 
property, plant and equipment (McNichols, 2001). 
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The model proposed by Jones (1991) starts with an expectation model for total accruals 
to control for changes in the economic circumstances, specifically the variation in revenues 
and the level of Property, Plant and Equipment. However, this model assumes that revenues 
are non-discretionary, while it is possible that managers accrue revenues at year-end, when 
the cash has not yet been received and it is questionable whether the revenues have been 
earned, resulting in an increase in revenues and total accruals through an increase in 
receivables (Dechow et al, 1995).  
Therefore, Dechow et al. (1995) proposed a modified version of the Jones (1991) model, 
eliminating its tendency to measure discretionary accruals with errors when revenues are 
opportunistically modified. In this model, the non-discretionary accruals are estimated as 
equation (1) and (2): 
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Where, TAi,t is the total accruals for each firm at each period; ATi,t-1 is the lagged total 
assets; ∆REVi,t is the annual variation in revenues; PPE,t is the Gross property, plant and 
equipment; and ∆RECi,t is the annual variation in the net receivables. 
Also following Dechow et al. (1995), we calculate total accruals as the difference 
between the variation of current assets and the variation of current liabilities, minus variation 
on cash flow from operations and depreciation, plus the variation on debt in current liabilities. 
We calculate the absolute discretionary accruals separately for each industry, in order to 
isolate the effects of industry patterns.  
 
3.3 Measure of corruption 
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As a measure of corruption we use the Corruption Perceptions Index, which is a leading 
measure of perceptions regarding corruption that ranks countries by perceived levels of 
corruption among public officials. A higher index indicates lower levels of perceived corruption. 
It has been launched in 1995 by Transparency International (a civil society organization 
founded in 1993 that has as its main purpose to combat corruption). Since then, it has been 
published annually. Hereafter the word corruption will be used to refer to perceptions of 
corruption. 
 
3.4 Empirical Model 
In order to analyze the association between the level of earnings management of 
foreign firms with ADR in the U.S. market and the level of perceived corruption in their 
respective countries, we built the following model: 
 
 
.                (3) 
 
where the main independent variable, CORR, is the Corruption Perception Index 
computed by the Transparency International Organization. Besides the corruption index we 
add in our model the following country-level variables: the level of protection of minority 
investors (PMI) and the level of contracts enforcement (EC).  
The set of firm-level variables comprises a dummy variable indicating firms audited by 
a non-Big 4 audit firm (N_BIG), a variable indicating the debt structure of each firm at each 
period (LEV), a dummy variable indicating firms reporting negative earnings (NEG), the firms’ 
profitability (ROA) and the firms’ size (SIZE).   
In order to analyze whether the effect of corruption in the level of earnings management 
is higher in the emerging countries, when compared to developed countries, we add in model 
(3) interactions of each of the country-variables (CORR, PMI and EC) with a dummy that 
indicates the type of country (emerging versus developed). These interactions are necessary 
 13 
to evaluate any differences in the effect of these institutional variables between emerging and 
developed countries.  
 
4. Empirical Findings 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the regression variables, which includes 
either country-level or firm-level variables. Table 2 also shows descriptive statistics separately 
for emerging and developed countries.  
 
[TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
The mean values of all country-level variables are statistically different, when firms from 
emerging countries are compared to those from developed countries. The corruption 
perception index (CORR), that assumes higher values for countries with a lower level of 
perceived corruption, the minority investors protection index (PMI) and the enforcing contracts 
index (EC) are significantly higher in developed countries. However, the level of earnings 
management (|DA|) of firms from emerging and from developed countries is not statistically 
different. 
Table 3 presents the mean values (of 2011 to 2013) of the country-level variables 
separately for each country. In the group of emerging countries, Singapore and Chile have the 
highest index of corruption perception, even above some developed countries, such as 
Greece, Hungary, Israel and Italy. At the lower position among the emerging countries are the 
Philippines, Mexico and Argentina, contrasting with some of the developed countries, such as 
Denmark, Finland, New Zealand and Sweden. 
 
[TABLE 3 HERE] 
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Table 4 presents correlations for the continuous variables included in the regressions. 
Consistent with established results in the accounting literature, the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals is negatively and significantly associated with the firms’ profitability and 
size, when one considers the full sample. Considering only the emerging countries, firms more 
leveraged present a higher level of absolute discretionary accruals while larger firms present 
lower values of discretionary accruals. When considering the sample of developed countries, 
one sees that bigger, more leveraged and more profitable firms tend to present less absolute 
discretionary accruals. The results for the full sample show that the main independent variable 
used in this study (CORR) has a significant and positive univariate relationship with the 
variables PMI and EC, at the country-level, and a negative relationship with the variables ROA 
and SIZE.  
Interestingly, the correlation with PMI is 0.1437 for the full sample, but is much stronger 
for the sample of the emerging countries (0.4053) and is negative (-0.0753) for the sample of 
developed countries, suggesting a different relationship between corruption and minority 
investors’ protection in developed and emerging countries. Further, corruption is only 
correlated with PMI in the emerging countries, but is significantly associated with EC, LEV, 
ROA and SIZE in the developed countries. The correlation between PMI and the other 
variables also varies between the two groups of countries, also presenting opposite signs 
regarding EC and LEV.  
Regarding the firm-level variables, leveraged is also different between the two groups. 
While bigger and more profitable firms tend to be more leveraged in emerging countries, in 
developed countries, firms with these characteristics tend to be less leveraged. 
 
[TABLE 4 HERE] 
 
4.2 Regression Results 
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Table 5 presents the results of the regression models performed in order to analyze the 
association between the level of earnings management of foreign firms with ADR in the U.S. 
market and the level of perceived corruption in their respective countries. 
 
[TABLE 5 HERE] 
 
The dependent variable used in the analysis is the absolute value of discretionary 
accruals of each firm and the main independent variable if the Corruption Perception Index 
computed by the Transparency International Organization. In order to control for alternative 
explanations for the level of earnings management, the model also includes a set of country-
level (PMI and EC) and firm-level (N_BIG, LEV, ROA, NEG and SIZE) variables. The 
regression is estimated with industry fixed effects and with robust standard errors. 
Table 5, Column I, shows the results of the analysis of the entire sample without taking 
into account any differences between emerging and developed countries. The results provide 
empirical evidence that any of the country-level variable coefficients, including CORR, are 
statistically significant. Regarding the firm-level variables, the coefficients of ROA and Size are 
negative and statistically significant, while the coefficient of the variable NEG is positive and 
also statistically significant. It seems that larger and profitable firms are less likely to engage 
in earnings management practices. These findings are consistent with previous studies as 
those of Chen et al. (2010) and Barth et al (2008).  
Table 5, Columns II and III, shows the analysis of the entire sample but capturing any 
differences between emerging and developed countries. Column II shows that the coefficient 
of the main independent variable (CORR) is negative and statistically significant but only in the 
group of firms from emerging countries (CORR x E). It seems that, in the emerging countries, 
a lower level of perceived corruption (which means a higher value of the Corruption 
Perceptions Index) is associated with a lower level of earnings management, which does not 
happen in developed countries. 
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Table 5, Column II, also shows that the coefficient of the variable PMI is negative and 
statically significant, which means that a higher level of minority investors’ protection is 
associated with a lower level of earnings management. These results as consistent with the 
argument that favorable institutional factors create a supportive financial environment that 
reduce managerial incentives to manipulate earnings. However, the coefficient of the 
interaction term of the variables PMI and E is positive and statistically significant, which means 
that, in the emerging countries, the relationship between the level of investors’ protection and 
the level of earnings management can not be found or, at least, is smaller when compared to 
developed countries.  
Countries might determine particular laws to guarantee specific rights to minor 
shareholders. However, its effective application relies upon enforcement and Government 
conduct. Thus, for firms located in countries with higher corruption perception, rules protecting 
minor shareholders appear to not influence the reduction of earnings management.  
The results presented in Table 5, Column III, are consistent with those found in Column 
II. The coefficient of the main independent variable (CORR) is negative while the estimate of 
the interaction term of CORR with the dummy D is positive, and they are both statistically 
significant. It seems that the level of perceived corruption explains the level of earnings 
management but only in the group of firms from emerging countries.  
Table 5, Column III, also shows that the association between minority investors’ 
protection and earnings management only hold in the group of firms from developed countries. 
Solely the coefficient of the interaction term of the variables PMI and D is negative and 
statistically significant. For firms located in emerging countries, which present higher levels of 
corruption perception, minority rights appear not to reduce managers’ incentives to manipulate 
earnings. 
Table 6 shows the analysis separately for the groups of firms from emerging and from 
developed countries. The results are consistent to those presented in Table 5. 
 
[TABLE 6 HERE] 
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Overall, we observe that firms’ characteristics are relevant to determine the level of 
earnings management for ADR issuing firms, regardless firms’ location. The role of country-
level variables, otherwise, appears to be conditioned to the firms’ country, being emerging or 
developed. The results indicate that corruption perception (minority investors’ protection) 
reduce firms’ incentives to manipulate earnings for firms located in emerging (developed) 
countries, while such results are not identified in developed (emerging) countries.  
 
5. Conclusion  
This study analyse the relation between earnings management and countries’ corruption 
levels by examining whether foreign firms with ADR in the U.S. market from countries 
presenting higher levels of corruption are more likely to have higher levels of earnings 
management than their counterparts from countries with lower levels of corruption. Control 
variables pertaining to important factors that previous literature detected as being linked with 
earnings management were considered.  
The empirical findings suggest that corruption perception is related to higher incentives 
for firms to manipulate earnings for firms located in emerging countries, while such results are 
not identified in developed countries. The findings confirm results of previous studies pertaining 
to the impact of corruption on accounting quality (Riahi-Belkaoui, 2004; Riahi-Belkaoui and 
AlNajjar, 2006). In addition, the study suggests the existence of threshold level of corruption, 
below which the effects on earnings management are no longer significant. This indicates that 
there may be a level of institutional development in terms of fight against corruption above 
which there is no significant impact of lack of tolerance regarding corruption on earnings 
management. Further studies are required to validate this possibility.  
One of the main limitations of this study pertain to the corruption perceptions index, which 
is based on perceptions of corruption rather than on the real phenomenon. Further studies 
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Table 1. Distribution of firm-year observations 
 
Panel A. Emerging Countries 
Argentina  18 
Brazil  141 
Chile  36 
Mexico  57 
Peru  9 
Philipines  9 
Poland  3 
Russia  45 
Singapore  3 
South Africa  78 
Turkey  6 
Total  405 
   
Panel B. Developed Countries 
Austria  30 
Austrália  168 
Belgium  15 
Denmark  15 
Finland  15 
France  75 
Germany  93 
Greece  3 
Holand  36 
Hong Kong  21 
Hungary  9 
Ireland  21 
Israel  18 
Italy  30 
New Zeland  6 
North Korea  27 
Norway  24 
Portugal  3 
Spain  18 
Sweden  27 
Switzerland  18 
United Kingdom  204 
Total  876 
   
Total number  1.281 
 
Panel C. Industries 
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing (SIC 0)  12 
Mining and Construction (SIC 1)  195 
Manufacturing I (SIC 2)  258 
Manufacturing II (SIC 3)  267 
Utilities (SIC 4)  276 
Wholesale Trade (SIC 5)  96 
Finance, Insurance and Real State (SIC 6)  27 
Services I (SIC 7)  93 
Services II (SIC 8)  57 
   
Total number  1.281 




Table 2. Descriptive statistics for the country-level and firm-level variables 
      All Countries  Emerging Countries Developed Countries   t-Stat.a 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.  
Country-Level Variables 
CORR 6.5240 2.0032 4.1060 1.2026 7.6410 1.1169 51.388* 
PMI 61.9701 13.3694 59.4067 11.5960 63.1553 13.9621 4.704* 
EC 69.3411 9.5842 61.4353 8.1314 72.9961 7.8594 24.242* 
        
Firm-Level Variables 
LEV 0.5238 0.2380 0.5222 0.2408 0.5245 0.2368 0.163 
ROA 0.0135 0.1844 0.0486 0.0870 -0.0027 0.2131 -4.667* 
SIZE 15.2950 2.2719 15.3239 1.5564 15.2816 2.5361 -0.310 
        
|DA| 0.0391 0.0433 0.0408 0.0421 0.0383 0.0438 -0.960 
        
CORR: corruption perception index; PMI: index of minority investors protection; EC: index of contract 
enforcement; LEV: ratio between total liabilities and total assets; ROA: return on assets; SIZE: natural 
logarithm of total assets; |DA|: absolute value of discretionary accruals. 
a Mean tests between emerging countries and developed countries. 













Argentina          3.30         50.00         65.13  
Brazil          4.00         53.33         52.51  
Chile          7.17         63.33         63.85  
Mexico          3.27         56.67         62.74  
Peru          3.67         64.44         57.40  
Philippines          3.20         43.33         53.90  
Poland          5.77         60.00         59.56  
Russia          2.67         46.67         76.13  
Singapore          8.83         93.33         89.54  
South Africa          4.17         80.00         66.14  









Australia          8.47         56.67         77.20  
Austria          7.20         50.00         81.55  
Belgium          7.50         70.00         77.67  
Denmark          9.17         63.33         68.79  
Finland          9.10         56.67         75.58  
France          7.07         56.67         77.80  
Germany          7.90         50.00         76.74  
Greece          3.67         37.78         49.38  
Hong Kong          7.87         90.00         80.01  
Hungary          5.17         43.33         73.36  
Ireland          7.20         83.33         76.70  
Israel          5.97         83.33         54.93  
Italy          4.13         60.00         42.61  
Korea          5.50         62.22         81.02  
Netherlands          8.53         44.44         75.04  
New Zealand          9.20         96.67         79.04  
Norway          8.70         66.67         78.41  
Portugal          6.20         60.00         69.95  
Spain          6.20         50.00         63.05  
Sweden          9.00         63.33         72.62  
Switzerland          8.63         30.00         71.96  





Table 4. Correlation Matrix 
All countries 
 DA CORR PMI EC LEV ROA SIZE 
ADA 1  -  -  -  -  -  -  
CORR -0.0066  1  -  -  -  -  -  
PMI -0.0230  0.1437 *** 1  -  -  -  -  
EC 0.0111  0.6292 *** -0.0039  1  -  -  -  
LEV -0.0560  -0.0678  0.0367  -0.1843 *** 1  -  -  
ROA -0.3302 *** -0.1341 *** 0.0482 * -0.0967 *** 0.0248  1  -  
SIZE -0.2965 *** -0.0877 *** -0.0540 * -0.1078 *** 0.3075 *** 0.4125 *** 1   
Emerging Countries 
 DA  CORR  PMI  EC  LEV  ROA  SIZE   
ADA 1  -  -  -  -  -  -  
CORR -0.0523  1  -  -  -  -  -  
PMI 0.0794  0.4053 *** 1  -  -  -  -  
EC 0.0002  -0.0674  0.2655 *** 1  -  -  -  
LEV 0.1151 ** 0.0486  -0.1543 *** -0.2535 *** 1  -  -  
ROA 0.0432  -0.0257  0.0998 ** 0.1678 *** -0.4453 *** 1  -  
SIZE -0.0856 * -0.0625  -0.2372 *** -0.0534  -0.1682 *** 0.1310 *** 1   
Developed Countries 
 DA  CORR  PMI  EC  LEV  ROA  SIZE   
ADA 1  -  -  -  -  -  -  
CORR 0.0649 * 1  -  -  -  -  -  
PMI -0.0562  -0.0753 ** 1  -  -  -  -  
EC 0.0459  0.5742 *** -0.2366 *** 1  -  -  -  
LEV -0.1330 *** -0.2133 *** 0.1109 *** -0.2123 *** 1  -  -  
ROA -0.4249 *** -0.0580 * 0.0633 ** -0.0699 ** 0.1177 *** 1  -  
SIZE -0.3606 *** -0.1703 *** -0.0106  -0.1489 *** 0.4534 *** 0.4514 *** 1  
ADA: absolute value of discretionary accruals; CORR: corruption perception index; PMI: index of minority 
investors protection; EC: index of contract enforcement; LEV: ratio between total liabilities and total assets; ROA: 
return on assets; SIZE: natural logarithm of total assets. 






Table 5. Regression results for the entire sample 
  I II III 
     
CORR  0.0046 0.0011 -0.0030 
  (0.555) (0.460) (0.052)* 
CORR x E  - -0.0041 - 
  - (0.045)** - 
CORR x D  - - 0.0040 
  - - (0.045)** 
PMI  -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0003 
  (0.263) (0.029)** (0.147) 
PMI x E  - 0.0005 - 
  - (0.031)** - 
PMI x D  - - -0.0005 
  - - (0.031)** 
EC  -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0003 
  (0.711) (0.433) (0.233) 
EC x E  - -0.0001 - 
  - (0.563) - 
EC x D  - - 0.0001 
  - - (0.563) 
N_BIG  -0.0025 -0.0017 -0.0017 
  (0.621) (0.736) (0.736) 
LEV  0.0097 0.0107 0.0107 
  (0.154) (0.121) (0.121) 
ROA  -0.0506 -0.0512 -0.0512 
  (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
NEG  0.0074 0.0073 0.0073 
  (0.045)** (0.049)** (0.049)** 
SIZE  -0.0041 -0.0041 -0.0041 
  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Intercept  0.1064 0.1019 0.1019 
  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
     
Adj. R-Squared. 0.2129 0.2167 0.2167 
F-Stat.  12.7367 18.7287 18.7287 
p-value F-Stat.  0.000 0.000 0.000 
     
OLS regressions with industry fixed effect. 
CORR: corruption perception index; PMI: index of minority investors protection; EC: 
index of contract enforcement; N_BIG: dummy indicating 1 for firms audited by a 
non-big 4 auditing firm; LEV: ratio between total liabilities and total assets; ROA: 
return on assets; NEG: dummy indicating 1 for firms with negative results; SIZE: 
natural logarithm of total assets. 
E is a dummy indicating 1 for emerging countries and 0 otherwise. D is a dummy 
indicating 1 for developed countries and 0 otherwise 
Numbers outside parenthesis indicate estimated coefficient for each variable.  
Numbers inside parenthesis indicate p-value for t-test of each variable. 








Table 6. Regression results for the two groups of countries 
 




    
CORR  -0.0029 0.0009 
  (0.071)* (0.487) 
PMI  0.0004 -0.0002 
  (0.101) (0.025)** 
EC  -0.0001 -0.0002 
  (0.618) (0.321) 
N_BIG  0.0111 -0.0086 
  (0.134) (0.171) 
LEV  0.0352 0.0060 
  (0.121) (0.435) 
ROA  -0.0512 -0.0586 
  (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
NEG  0.0143 0.0105 
  (0.066)* (0.016)* 
SIZE  -0.0024 -0.0042 
  (0.083)* (0.000)* 
Intercept  0.0405 0.1088 
  (0.228) (0.000)*** 
    
Adj. R-Squared. 0.1105 0.2916 
F-Stat.  3.1606 22.7212 
p-value F-Stat.  0.000 0.000 
    
OLS regressions with industry fixed effect with robust standard errors 
CORR: corruption perception index; PMI: index of minority investors protection; EC: 
index of contract enforcement; N_BIG: dummy indicating 1 for firms audited by a 
non-big 4 auditing firm; LEV: ratio between total liabilities and total assets; ROA: 
return on assets; NEG: dummy indicating 1 for firms with negative results; SIZE: 
natural logarithm of total assets. 
E is a dummy indicating 1 for emerging countries and 0 otherwise. D is a dummy 
indicating 1 for developed countries and 0 otherwise 
Numbers outside parenthesis indicate estimated coefficient for each variable.  
Numbers inside parenthesis indicate p-value for t-test of each variable. 
***, ** and * represent significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1, respectively. 
 
